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Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: HIPAA’s Effect on Informal
Discovery in Products Liability and
Personal Injury Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
With the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),1 personally identifiable health
information was subjected to a regulatory scheme that was stricter in
most jurisdictions than previous regulations. To the average person,
this was manifest through an increase in the number of signatures
requested by physicians and pharmacists. Practicing attorneys,
however, soon came to realize that this legislation affected much
more than their time at the doctor’s office. HIPAA displays an
inherent disdain for informal discovery, a disdain that has led some
attorneys to complain that HIPAA’s restrictions prevent them from
adequately serving their clients.2 In particular, the privacy rules
promulgated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) under HIPAA directly affect the way in which litigators
pursue informal discovery, such as ex parte interviews (i.e. interviews
conducted without notice to the adverse party).3 This Comment
discusses not only the effects of HIPAA that have already been
discussed by the courts, but also delves into unresolved questions
regarding informal discovery. Until questions about the extent of
HIPAA’s applications are answered, attorneys and investigators will
continue to be forced onto unsteady ground in their efforts to
provide their clients with high-quality representation.
This Comment argues that while the courts have recognized and
accepted HIPAA’s disdain for informal discovery (particularly in the
form of ex parte interviews between physicians and attorneys), this
disdain should not extend to ex parte communications between

1. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
2. See Jerry Potter, Can We Talk? The Recent Givens Decision Says No, 38 TENN. B.J.
15, 20 (2002); Bobby Russ, Can We Talk? The Rest of the Story or Why Defense Attorneys Should
Not Talk to the Plaintiff’s Doctors, 39 TENN. B.J. 29, 29 (2003).
3. See HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164 (2006).
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emergency response personnel and attorneys. In many jurisdictions,
HIPAA has been interpreted to limit contact with a plaintiff’s
physician to formal discovery through depositions and
interrogatories. In some jurisdictions, ex parte interviews are never
allowed. This stance is understandable considering the premium
placed on personal health information and the policy considerations
that support protection of the physician-patient privilege. But the
rules and definitions of HIPAA have, perhaps unintentionally,
extended this restriction against ex parte interviews to emergency
response personnel. In the past, common practice in products
liability or personal injury litigation has been for the attorney to
conduct informal interviews with fact witnesses, such as EMTs, in an
effort to obtain as much information as possible during the early
stages of litigation. A cautious and perceptive attorney, or an
attorney threatened with HIPAA sanctions by opposing counsel,
would note that technically, HIPAA proscribes such interviews with
EMTs and paramedics. This Comment argues that such a
proscription is unnecessary, and should be eliminated.
The application of HIPAA’s regulatory scheme to EMTs and
paramedics can be problematic for an attorney, especially one who is
used to conducting ex parte interviews according to common
practice.4 Nevertheless, should the courts strictly adhere to HIPAA’s
language, it is both likely and unfortunate that emergency response
personnel would be subject to the same restrictions as a plaintiff’s
physician, thus eliminating useful tools for early discovery in
products liability and personal injury litigation. But strong policy
reasons support excluding EMTs and paramedics from HIPAA’s
restrictions.

4. For indications of the common opinion among attorneys that fact witnesses should
be personally interviewed as soon as possible, see, e.g., Jacob Williams Law Firm, PLLC,
Personal Injury, http://jacobwilliamslaw.com/indexpage_7/PracticeArea.shtml (last visited
Sept. 13, 2006) (“[S]omeone should interview all witnesses and record their comments. Such
interviews should be completed as soon as possible as witnesses’ memories tend to fade with
time.”); LawInfo.com, Auto/Truck Accidents Attorneys, http://www.lawinfo.com/index.
cfm/fuseaction/Client.lawarea/categoryid/1177 (last visited Sept. 13, 2006) (“Interview all
witnesses and record their comments either at the scene of the accident or as soon as possible
afterwards. It is important to do these interviews as quickly as possible because witnesses’
memories tend to fade with time and the information you get may not be as valuable to you.
Information gathered immediately or very soon after the accident will be much more accurate
than any recalled at some later date.”).

1076

ROCHE.MRO.DOC

1075]

10/12/2006 1:12:45 PM

HIPAA’s Effect on Informal Discovery

The physician-patient privilege, which supplies much of the
incentive for the privacy of personal medical information, does not
exist in an emergency responder context.5 As a result, the policy
implications of the physician-patient privilege are weakened in an
emergency response context. EMTs and paramedics do not usually
have a continuing relationship with patients, nor are they particularly
sought out or chosen by patients. And most importantly, there is no
historical legal basis for applying the physician-patient privilege to
EMTs or paramedics.
EMTs and paramedics are also less likely to disclose confidential
personal information. Generally, the purpose behind informal
interviews with emergency response personnel early on in litigation is
to assess the facts behind an incident and to discover the types of
injuries that may have occurred. The facts surrounding an accident
do not constitute personal medical information, and the injuries
incurred during an accident are not protected in litigation because
they represent a basis for a plaintiff’s claim for relief.
Finally, emergency response personnel are involved in numerous
incidents each day, and tend to forget details that a defense attorney
may find important, especially in the context of deposition testimony
given months or years after an incident. The motivation for a quick
informal interview with an emergency responder is to glean essential
facts that might be forgotten prior to a deposition or that might not
be considered important enough by the responder to be included in
the usual reports and paperwork. Such information can be invaluable
to an attorney.
This Comment begins with a discussion of informal discovery
and the HIPAA regulations that affect informal discovery in products
liability and personal injury cases. Part III then discusses recent cases
in which the courts, at both the federal and state levels, have
interpreted HIPAA regulations in relation to discovery issues in civil
actions, particularly ex parte interviews with a plaintiff’s physician.
Part IV goes one step beyond these court decisions and discusses
how HIPAA’s regulations apply not only to physicians but also to
EMTs and paramedics. Part IV also analyzes the policy issues that
will inevitably arise when this question comes before the courts. Part
V offers a brief conclusion.

5. See 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 349 & n.6 (2006).
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II. HIPAA
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
was passed to
improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in
the group and individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and
abuse in health insurance and health care delivery, to promote the
use of medical savings accounts, to improve access to long-term
care services and coverage, to simplify the administration of health
insurance, and for other purposes.6

When it comes to litigation, however, the parts of the Act that are of
greatest importance are the privacy rules created to restrict the use
and disclosure of an individual’s personal health information.7 These
rules and procedures limit and control the way an attorney (or
anyone else) can discover the health-related information of another
individual. Thus, litigators need to be familiar with HIPAA to avoid
violating its restrictions.8
A. Authorizations
HIPAA’s restrictions on the discovery of personal medical
information are broadly applicable and are manifest to the public
mainly through the prolific increase in required consent and
authorization forms at the doctor’s office. To begin, HIPAA states
that except in a few instances—such as when consent alone is
sufficient—“a covered entity may not use or disclose protected
health information without an authorization that is valid under this
section. When a covered entity obtains or receives a valid
authorization for its use or disclosure of protected health
information, such use or disclosure must be consistent with such
authorization.”9 Essentially, a “covered entity” must not disseminate
a person’s medical information without the person’s written
6. HIPAA, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936.
7. See Robert B. Miller & Jeff Robertson, HIPAA? Huh?: Discovering Medical Records
in Oregon After HIPAA, 64 OR. ST. B. BULL. 31, 31 (2004).
8. Elizabeth Robinson, HIPAA for Litigators, 8 HAW. B.J. 5, 5 (2004).
9. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1) (2005). HIPAA expressly permits a covered entity to
disclose health information without an authorization to other covered entities for purposes of
“treatment, payment, or health care operations.” Id. § 164.506(a). In such instances, the
health care provider is not required to obtain a full authorization with all of the elements listed
in § 164.508. It may, however, obtain a simple signed consent form. See id. § 164.506(b)(1).
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authorization, and the “covered entity” must adhere to the express
terms of the authorization if any information is indeed disclosed.
One can easily see the impact of this requirement in the
proliferation of paperwork that awaits anyone in need of medical
care. But this authorization rule is not as simple as one might think.
A number of ambiguities tend to create confusion about this and
HIPAA’s other requirements.10 One such ambiguity lies in the
application of the term “covered entity.”11 HIPAA “states that
‘covered entities’ include health care providers, health plans (which
include group plans), insurance companies, parts of Medicare,
Medicaid, long-term care providers, and employee welfare benefit
plans. The term also includes health care clearinghouses, which
process health data and provide billing services.”12 As will be
discussed later, the breadth of the definition of a “covered entity” is
problematic and should be limited in scope.13
A second point of confusion is what exactly constitutes a “valid”
authorization. According to the text of HIPAA, a valid authorization
must contain specific elements such as a description of the
information to be used or disclosed, the name of the person
authorized to make the requested use or disclosure, the name of the
person to whom the covered entity may make the requested use or
disclosure, a description of each purpose of the requested use or
disclosure, an expiration date or event, and a dated signature.14 In
addition, a valid authorization must place an individual on notice of
the right to revoke the authorization in writing, of the ability or
inability of the covered entity to condition treatment upon signature
of the authorization, and of the fact that information subject to the
authorization may cease to be protected.15 Finally, an authorization
must be written in plain language, and if the authorization allows a
covered entity to disclose protected health information, the
individual who signed it must receive a copy.16
10. Laura Parker, Medical-Privacy Law Creates Wide Confusion, USA TODAY, Oct. 17,
2003, at A1.
11. See David R. Morantz, Comment, HIPAA’s Headaches: A Call for a First
Amendment Exception to the Newly Enacted Health Care Privacy Rules, 53 U. KAN. L. REV.
479, 482 (2005).
12. Id. (citations omitted).
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1).
15. Id. § 164.508(c)(2).
16. Id. § 164.508(c)(3)–(4).
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An authorization can become defective, and therefore null, in
several ways. An authorization becomes defective if the expiration
date has passed or the expiration event is known by the covered
entity to have occurred, the authorization has not been filled out
completely, the authorization is known by the covered entity to have
been revoked, the authorization violates prohibitions against
compound authorizations or conditioning of treatment on
authorization, or if any material information in the authorization is
known by the covered entity to be false.17 The myriad requirements
and possible disqualifiers tend to add confusion as to when an
authorization is valid, what information is permitted to be disclosed,
and to whom the information is available.
B. Exceptions to the Authorization Requirement
While the authorization requirement is the most pervasive and
perhaps most significant to the average person, it is not always viable
for a defense attorney to obtain a plaintiff’s authorization in order to
receive medical records or other protected health information when
the records become at issue in a lawsuit. If an attorney wishes to
conduct an ex parte interview with a plaintiff’s treating physician
(assuming the law of that jurisdiction permits such an interview),
HIPAA does nothing to prohibit the plaintiff from simply refusing to
sign the authorization. In a personal injury or products liability
lawsuit, the medical treatment and condition of the plaintiff is one of
the central issues, and thus the plaintiff’s medical information is
pertinent and necessary for proper defense. For this reason, HIPAA
includes several exceptions to the authorization requirement that are
of particular importance in litigation.
HIPAA provides that an authorization is not required in order
for a covered entity to disclose protected health information in
judicial or administrative proceedings and allows disclosure in
response to an order of a court or administrative tribunal.18 Health
information can also be disclosed without an authorization
[i]n response to a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful
process, that is not accompanied by an order of a court . . . , if:

17. Id. § 164.508(b)(2).
18. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(i)–(ii).
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(A) The covered entity receives satisfactory assurance . . . from the
party seeking the information that reasonable efforts have been
made by such party to ensure that the individual who is the subject
of the protected health information that has been requested has
been given notice of the request; or
(B) The covered entity receives satisfactory assurance . . . from the
party seeking the information that reasonable efforts have been
made by such party to secure a qualified protective order . . . .19

The simplest way to gain access to a plaintiff’s medical records is
by obtaining a court order,20 but medical records can also be
disclosed if the party seeking the information can provide
“satisfactory assurance” to the covered entity that reasonable efforts
have been made to inform the subject of the request that the
information is being sought.21 This can be accomplished by
providing documentation proving that the party requesting the
information has made a good-faith effort to provide written notice to
individuals whose records are being requested.22 As long as the
notice includes sufficient information about the litigation for which
the records are sought, and the party whose records are at issue has
had sufficient time to object to the disclosure, the court can permit
the records to be disclosed.23
A third method for obtaining the medical records without an
authorization is to make a showing of “satisfactory assurance” that
reasonable efforts have been made to obtain a protective order.24 The
documentation in that case should show that either (1) the parties to
the dispute giving rise to the request for information have agreed to
a qualified protective order and have presented it to the court, or (2)
the party seeking the protected health information has requested a
qualified protective order from the court.25 A “qualified protective
order” is an order of the court or a stipulation by the parties to the
litigation that both prohibits the parties from using or disclosing the
protected health information for any purpose other than the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii).
See generally id. § 164.512(e)(1)(i).
Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(iii).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(iv).
Id.
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litigation or proceeding for which such information was requested,
and requires the return or destruction of the protected health
information (including all copies made) at the end of the litigation or
proceeding.26
Finally, HIPAA does not prevent a covered entity from releasing
protected information pursuant to a subpoena, discovery request, or
other lawful process, even if the entity does not receive satisfactory
assurances, as long as the party seeking the information has made
reasonable efforts to provide satisfactory notice or obtain a qualified
protective order.27 Although releasing information in these situations
is allowed, to avoid coming into conflict with HIPAA’s regulatory
scheme, discovery requests and court orders must be drafted to
request only the minimum amount of information necessary.28
C. Ex Parte Interviews
The specific provisions of HIPAA that govern discovery of
protected personal health information are lengthy and confusing,29
but they are by no means comprehensive. One issue not explicitly
addressed in HIPAA’s text is the legality of defense attorneys’
practice of conducting ex parte interviews with plaintiffs’ physicians.
Despite the effect that HIPAA has had on informal discovery,
nowhere among HIPAA’s express purposes, or even in HIPAA’s
legislative history, is any reference made to ex parte interviews.30
Rather, the impact on informal discovery tactics in litigation has
come without an expressed Congressional intent to that end.31 Not
only is there a conspicuous absence of “any reference to or any
balancing of the competing policy considerations regarding ex parte
interviews,”32 but the DHHS specifically stated that at least one of its
HIPAA privacy regulations was “not intended to disrupt current
practice whereby an individual who is a party to a proceeding and has
put his or her medical condition at issue will not prevail without

26. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(v).
27. Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(vi).
28. Id. § 164.502(b).
29. See Parker, supra note 10, at A1 (pointing out that HIPAA’s privacy regulations
began as a 337-word guideline before swelling to 101,000 words).
30. See Conning the IADC Newsletters, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 199, 209 (2004).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 211.
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consenting to the production of his or her protected information.”33
It is important to note that this statement says nothing about
whether such information has to be provided informally or through
formal judicial proceedings, and thus does nothing to clarify what
effect HIPAA will have on informal proceedings such as ex parte
interviews.
In addition, some of the cases addressing this issue not only
involve applying HIPAA to ex parte conversations,34 but also raise
the question of whether ex parte communications are permitted even
if HIPAA’s basic requirements for discovery are met. The next Part
will discuss these cases and how some courts have ruled on the
legality of ex parte interviews.
III. EX PARTE INTERVIEWS OF PHYSICIANS UNDER HIPAA
Prior to HIPAA, many states had already prohibited defense
attorneys from conducting ex parte interviews with a plaintiff’s
treating physician.35 In fact, practitioners disagreed about the
appropriateness of permitting an opposing attorney to privately
interview a client’s treating physician and argued both sides of the
issue in law reviews and journal articles.36 In an article published in
1999, one author listed nineteen states that prohibited ex parte
interviews with physicians and nineteen states plus the District of
Columbia where such interviews were permitted.37 By the time full
compliance with HIPAA was required on April 14, 2003,38 one tally
33. 65 Fed. Reg. 82,530 (Dec. 28, 2000) (discussing 45 C.F.R. § 164.512).
34. HIPAA explicitly includes both oral and recorded information in its definition of
“health information.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(4) (2005).
35. See Christopher Smith, Comment, Recognizing the Split: The Jurisdictional
Treatment of Defense Counsel’s Ex Parte Contact with Plaintiff’s Treating Physician, 23 J.
LEGAL PROF. 247, 252–53 (1999).
36. See, e.g., Barbara Podlucky Berens, Note, Defendants’ Right To Conduct Ex Parte
Interviews with Treating Physicians in Drug or Medical Device Cases, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1451
(1989); Smith, supra note 35.
37. The states prohibiting ex parte interviews included Alabama, Arizona, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New
York, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wyoming. See Smith, supra note 35, at 252–55.
The jurisdictions that permitted ex parte interviews included Alaska, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky,
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. See id.
38. Crenshaw v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1027–28 (S.D. Cal. 2004).
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found that fifteen states and the District of Columbia expressly
permitted conducting ex parte interviews with a plaintiff’s health care
provider while twenty-four states expressly prohibited the same
practice.39 Considering this disparity, it is not surprising that the
issue of ex parte interviews under HIPAA came before the courts in
only a matter of months. As noted above, HIPAA did not directly
address the propriety of conducting ex parte interviews.
Consequently, subsequent court decisions applying HIPAA were
largely decided on state laws and on conflicting policy
considerations. In the end, these decisions did little to unify the
disparate treatment of ex parte communications with physicians.
A. Court Determinations of HIPAA’s Impact on Informal Discovery
While the bulk of the following cases were decided in the federal
courts, the first case of note was decided in a New Jersey state court
in September 2003.40 In Smith v. American Home Products Corp.,
plaintiffs alleged personal injuries as the result of the use of
phenylpropanolamine (PPA).41 The defendant drug manufacturers
filed a motion to compel ex parte interviews with the plaintiffs’
physicians.42 This was a case of first impression as to whether HIPAA
preempted New Jersey case law that expressly permitted ex parte
interviews with a plaintiff’s health care provider.43
The key regulation in this case was 45 C.F.R. § 160.203, which
provides that HIPAA preempts any contrary provisions of state law
unless “[t]he provision of State law relates to the privacy of
individually identifiable health information and is more stringent
than a standard, requirement, or implementation specification
adopted under [HIPAA].”44 Accordingly, the New Jersey Superior
Court analyzed New Jersey’s state law and determined that HIPAA

39. Connie A. Mateo & David C. Uitti, HIPAA and State Discovery Practices, 3
PHARMACEUTICAL & MED. DEVICE L. BULL., Sept. 16, 2003, at 1.
40. Smith v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 855 A.2d 608 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003).
41. Id. at 610.
42. Id.
43. Id.; see Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1985) (creating informal discovery
procedures for the state of New Jersey which include provisions allowing for the ex parte
interview of a plaintiff’s physician).
44. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2005); see also Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705,
709–10 (D. Md. 2004).
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does not preempt New Jersey’s informal discovery techniques.45 The
court stated that a determination of whether a state law was more
stringent and thus avoided preemption should be based on a
determination of whether the state law
1) prohibits or restricts a use or disclosure more so than the Privacy
Rule; 2) permits greater rights of access to or amendment of
information; 3) provides the individual with a greater amount of
information; 4) narrows the scope or duration of an authorization
or consent, expands the criteria necessary for an authorization or
consent, or reduces the coercive effect of the circumstances
surrounding an authorization or consent; or 5) requires longer or
more detailed retention or reporting of disclosures.46

The court relied on the fact that none of HIPAA’s regulations
explicitly address the issue of ex parte interviews with treating
physicians47 and made the determination that informal discovery in
New Jersey would be governed by state law. In the court’s words,
“[n]owhere in HIPAA does the issue of ex parte [sic] interviews with
treating physicians come into view; therefore, this court finds no
express preemption regarding such interviews, leaving [them] a
viable tool for defense counsel.”48 While those practicing law in New
Jersey could thereafter feel comfortable adhering to state law and
conducting ex parte interviews, the Smith decision left little guidance
for those in other jurisdictions.
Unlike the New Jersey court in Smith, the Federal District Court
for the District of Maryland concluded that HIPAA was more
stringent than the relevant state law.49 In one of the earliest federal
cases on the subject, Law v. Zuckerman, the plaintiff, Rosalyn Law,
sued physician David Zuckerman for medical malpractice.50 During
pre-trial discovery, the defendant’s counsel conducted ex parte
interviews with the plaintiff’s current physician, Thomas Pinckert.51
As a result of those interviews, the plaintiff filed a motion that raised
two questions of first impression in the Fourth Circuit: (1) did

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Smith, 855 A.2d at 621.
Id. at 622.
Id.
Id. at 626.
Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 711.
Id. at 707.
Id.
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defense counsel’s ex parte communications with the plaintiff’s
physician violate HIPAA, and (2) if so, was preventing defense
counsel from having any further contacts with Dr. Pinckert a proper
remedy?52
The court first found that HIPAA was more stringent than the
applicable Maryland law, and held that all ex parte communications
must be “conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in
HIPAA.”53 The court ruled that while defense counsel’s contact with
the plaintiff’s physician was technically a violation of HIPAA,
defendant’s attorneys had acted in good faith and the remedy
requested by the plaintiff—preventing defense counsel from any
further contact with Dr. Pinckert—was inappropriate.54 Most
importantly, however, the court determined that ex parte interviews
with a plaintiff’s physician are legitimate as long as defense counsel
adheres to the procedures set forth by HIPAA.55 Unlike Smith,
where the decision to permit the ex parte interview had been based
on state law, the court here found that HIPAA itself permitted ex
parte interviews, as long as those interviews were conducted pursuant
to HIPAA’s restrictions.
Other courts disagreed. In the spring of 2004, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California decided whether
defense counsel should be disqualified for improper ex parte
communications with one of the plaintiff’s treating physicians.56 In
the unusual circumstances of Crenshaw v. Mony Life Insurance Co.,
the defense hired an expert witness, Dr. Harris, who had on one
occasion treated the plaintiff.57 If the plaintiff’s one meeting with Dr.
Harris was sufficient to make Dr. Harris a treating physician, HIPAA
required that defense counsel give notice to the plaintiff before
meeting with him.58
The court determined, based on both federal and state law, that
Dr. Harris was not the plaintiff’s treating physician, and therefore
defense counsel had not committed any ethical violations.59 The
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
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court found, however, that even though the informal discovery
techniques employed by defense counsel were not prohibited by
California law, “HIPAA does not authorize ex parte contacts with
healthcare providers.”60 The court’s opinion was that “[o]nly formal
discovery requests appear to satisfy the requirements of [HIPAA].”61
While Zuckerman required that limited ex parte interviews be
conducted in compliance with HIPAA, Crenshaw went further,
finding that informal discovery was in direct violation of HIPAA’s
regulatory scheme.
Another federal court restricted the use of ex parte
communications when the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) alleged that the Boston Market Corporation
had engaged in disability discrimination.62 During discovery, the
defendant filed a motion seeking an order allowing ex parte
communication with two psychologists who had evaluated one of
the complaining witnesses.63 The witness admitted that the
defendant was authorized to obtain all of her medical records and to
depose her doctors, but contended that HIPAA precluded ex parte
discussions between the defendants and her doctors or
psychologists.64
The court pointed out, as had the other federal courts before it,
that HIPAA “does not expressly prohibit ex parte communications
with health providers for an adverse party, but neither does it
authorize such communications.”65 The court then discussed both
the Crenshaw66 and Zuckerman67 decisions before concluding that
“ex parte communications regarding the disclosure of health
information, while not expressly prohibited by HIPAA, create, as the
court in [Zuckerman] warned, too great a risk of running afoul of
that statute’s strong federal policy in favor of protecting the privacy
of patient medical records.”68 The court advised that while “non-

60. Id. at 1029.
61. Id.
62. EEOC v. Boston Mkt. Corp., No. CV 03-4227(LDW) (WDW), 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 27338 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2004).
63. Id. at *1.
64. Id. at *1–2.
65. Id. at *16.
66. Crenshaw, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1020.
67. Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (D. Md. 2004).
68. Boston Mkt., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27338, at *18.
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health related information such as the time or place of depositions”
can be discussed through ex parte communications, the “release of
health information is to be made only through the use of methods
listed in HIPAA.”69 As a result of this determination, the court
declined to permit ex parte release of the plaintiff’s personal health
information, even with a protective order that would meet HIPAA’s
requirements.70 This decision was a confirmation of the California
District Court’s decision that ex parte communications between
defense counsel and plaintiff’s health providers are not permissible.
In the past year and a half, the federal courts have decided at
least three more cases in which ex parte interviews with a plaintiff’s
physician were at issue. In the first case, the court decided that ex
parte interviews would be permitted if a qualified protective order
was in place, but the two most recent decisions tended to follow the
analysis of EEOC and have severely limited or completely done away
with this form of informal discovery.
The first of these decisions was Bayne v. Provost, which was
decided in January 2005 in the Northern District of New York.71
The defendants had presented the plaintiff with a HIPAA
authorization form in order to gain access to the defendant’s medical
records.72 Rather than signing the authorization provided by the
defendants, however, the plaintiff provided a limited medical release
that included the following statements: “This authorization is for
written records ONLY. You are NOT authorized to discuss any
matters relating to my medical condition, course of treatment or
prognosis.”73 The defendants objected to this limitation and asked
the court to decide if the plaintiff had the right to refuse defendants’
request for an ex parte interview with plaintiff’s medical providers.74
In making its determination, the court had little to rely on, but
took into account Zuckerman and Crenshaw.75 The court concluded
that an ex parte interview would be appropriate if a qualified
protective order (one consistent with HIPAA) was in place.76 While
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
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the court stated that it was “not quite prepared to say that there are
no built-in protections . . . which the Plaintiff, himself, can invoke to
limit his medical records and minimize the exposure of ex parte [sic]
interviews,”77 the court, nevertheless, granted the defendants a
qualified protective order and authorization to conduct an ex parte
interview with one of the plaintiff’s medical providers.78
Shortly after the Bayne decision, the District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan interpreted HIPAA more strictly.79
Croskey v. BMW of North America, Inc. involved the alleged
explosion of a radiator in a 1992 BMW 325.80 Plaintiff brought a
products liability action against the car manufacturer, and the
defendant filed a motion seeking the opportunity “to meet ex parte
with all of plaintiff’s treating physicians and health care providers.”81
The court first made the determination that HIPAA preempted
Michigan law.82 Then, following a review of existent case law on the
subject, the court concluded that
HIPAA does not permit informal discovery. With regard to
HIPAA, at least one court has stated that “informal discovery of
protected health information is now prohibited unless the patient
consents.” Another court has stated that “HIPAA does not
authorize ex parte contacts with healthcare providers.” . . . I find
these cases persuasive for the theory that ex parte meetings with
defense counsel are not permitted by HIPAA.83

Relying on its determination of “HIPAA’s distaste for informal
discovery,”84 the court ruled that ex parte interviews of plaintiff’s
physicians are available only when (1) the defendant has a HIPAA
valid authorization, (2) plaintiff’s counsel has been notified of the
desire to conduct the interview, and (3) the physician has been
notified that such an interview is not required.85 If both the plaintiff

77. Id. at 241–42.
78. Id. at 243.
79. See Croskey v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., No. 02-CV-73747-DT, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3673 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 14, 2005).
80. Id. at *2.
81. Id.
82. Id. at *20.
83. Id. at *15–16 (citing Law v. Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (D. Md. 2004);
Crenshaw v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1029 (S.D. Cal. 2004)).
84. Id. at *29.
85. Id.
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and the physician approve, the ex parte meeting can be conducted.86
Essentially, the Croskey court placed complete control over the
possibility of an ex parte interview in the hands of the plaintiff. The
court stated that no matter which of HIPAA’s provisions are used to
obtain an interview (such as obtaining a court order or issuing a
subpoena), the notice requirements must be fulfilled,87 once again
reiterating “HIPAA’s distaste for informal discovery.”88
The Croskey decision illustrates that the use of ex parte interviews
during discovery continues to be limited. While the majority of the
courts have determined that the informal and unauthorized use of
such meetings was eliminated by HIPAA, some cases have gone so
far as to prohibit, or severely limit, the arrangement of ex parte
interviews pursuant to HIPAA’s formal procedures. The Croskey
court felt that HIPAA was so strongly against informal discovery that
an ex parte interview could only be conducted with the permission of
the court, the plaintiff, and the physician himself.89 In light of these
requirements, a formal deposition would appear to be the simplest
method of discovery, and only in unusual circumstances would a
defense attorney find it useful to pursue the possibility of an ex parte
conversation with the plaintiff’s physician.
In July 2005, another federal district court considered the
legality of ex parte interviews.90 In that case, a class action suit
against the manufacturers of the drug Vioxx, the court had originally
ordered that any party wishing to interview a plaintiff’s physician had
to serve opposing counsel with a notice of their intent to do so.91
According to the court’s order, “opposing counsel would then be
permitted to attend and participate in the noticed interview, but if
opposing counsel decided not to participate in the interview, the
noticing party could conduct said interview without opposing
counsel’s presence.”92
The plaintiffs challenged the order, arguing that its application
should be limited to those physicians who had been named as

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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defendants.93 In the end, the court decided that the patient-physician
relationship would best be protected by restricting the defendants
from conducting ex parte interviews of the plaintiff’s treating
physicians, but allowing plaintiff’s counsel to engage in ex parte
interviews with any doctors that had not been named defendants.94
The court reasoned that
[t]he Defendants still are entitled to all of the medical records of
the Plaintiffs as well as the Plaintiff Profile Forms setting forth each
Plaintiff’s detailed medical history. The Defendants can also
continue to exercise their right to depose the Plaintiffs’ treating
physicians or confer with them in the presence of Plaintiffs’
counsel. Furthermore, as a practical matter, the Defendants already
have information, including documentation, regarding what its
representatives told the treating physicians about Vioxx. Therefore,
the Defendants do not need the doctors to tell them in ex parte
conferences what they already know.95

This argument provides support for the elimination of informal
discovery of personally identifiable health information. But some
argue that decisions such as this ignore the special considerations
that make ex parte interviews so valuable to defense counsel.96 While
both sides of the debate have offered reasons for their positions,
stronger reasoning supports the usefulness and value of such
interviews.
B. Policy Reasons Proffered for the Elimination of Informal Discovery
The preceding decisions are not in complete agreement on all
issues. Some of the courts permitted ex parte interviews only
according to the terms of HIPAA.97 One unreported opinion added
additional requirements to HIPAA’s express rules in order to protect
a plaintiff’s privacy rights.98 Others prohibited ex parte interviews
with a plaintiff’s treating physician altogether.99 But even the New
93. Id.
94. Id. at 477.
95. Id.
96. See Berens, supra note 36.
97. See, e.g., Bayne v. Provost, 359 F. Supp. 2d 234, 241 (N.D.N.Y. 2005); Law v.
Zuckerman, 307 F. Supp. 2d 705, 711 (D. Md. 2004).
98. Croskey v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., No. 02-CV-73747-DT, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3673, at *34 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 14, 2005).
99. See Crenshaw v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1015, 1029 (S.D. Cal. 2004);
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Jersey state court holding HIPAA inapplicable did not freely permit
ex parte interviews; rather, interviews in that court’s jurisdiction are
still subject to the restrictions imposed by the Stempler decision.100
Thus, in the time following HIPAA’s passage, no court in the
United States has held that ex parte interviews with a plaintiff’s
treating physician are permitted absent some sort of formal
restrictions. A defense attorney wishing to conduct an ex parte
interview with a plaintiff’s health provider must generally adhere to
strict and complicated formal procedures, and in some situations the
interview is either completely dependent on the plaintiff’s willingness
to allow it or prohibited altogether.
The debate regarding the extent to which informal discovery
should be permitted continues in spite of the seeming consensus that
informal discovery such as ex parte interviews are to be disfavored
when it comes to physicians. “The simple fact that Congress and the
DHHS did not address ex parte interviews in HIPAA and the
regulations is compelling evidence that courts retain the discretion to
permit these informal discovery devices on a jurisdiction-byjurisdiction basis.”101 No set standard is in place to govern the
availability of an ex parte interview, and the extent to which ex parte
interviews are permitted in any particular instance will depend in
large part on the jurisdiction’s judicial analysis of HIPAA’s interplay
with state law. There is still a split among states as to whether ex
parte communications with a plaintiff’s treating physician should be
permitted at all. What follows is a discussion of the policy
considerations that are at the heart of the disagreement.
1. The physician-patient privilege
Much of the support for HIPAA’s protections, and for general
privacy considerations in any medical context, is based on
recognition of the confidential relationship between doctor and
patient. While the physician-patient privilege did not exist under the
common law, most states recognize it by statute.102 The privilege
EEOC v. Boston Mkt. Corp., No. CV 03-4227(LDW) (WDW), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27338, at *20–21 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2004).
100. Stempler v. Speidell, 495 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1985); Smith v. Am. Home Prods. Corp.,
855 A.2d 608, 624 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2003).
101. Conning the IADC Newsletters, supra note 30, at 214.
102. See Smith, supra note 35, at 247–48 (citing David L. Woodard, Note, Shielding the
Plaintiff and Physician: The Prohibition of Ex Parte Contacts with a Plaintiff’s Treating
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provides support for the limitation or elimination of ex parte
interviews and encompasses a number of policy justifications, such as
encouraging patients to freely and candidly discuss medical concerns
with their doctors, fulfilling the public’s expectation that such
communications will be held privately, and protecting physicians that
lack legal training from inadvertent disclosures.103 Thus, it is not
surprising that prior to HIPAA’s passage, almost half of the states
already prohibited ex parte interviews of a plaintiff’s treating
physician.104 One federal court, in defending its decision to disallow
defense counsel’s ex parte contacts with plaintiffs’ physicians, went so
far as to quote the classical version of the Hippocratic Oath: “‘What
I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of
the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no account one
must spread abroad, I will keep to myself, holding such things
shameful to be spoken about.’”105 The court explained that
[t]he ethical rules and attendant laws regarding the relationship
between a physician and a patient serve both utilitarian and fairness
purposes. Confidentiality reduces the stigma attached to seeking
treatment for some infectious diseases and invites patients to
provide information about previous ailments with greater candor.
This effect allows physicians to provide more thorough preventative
care. Moreover, because “almost every member of the public is
aware of the promise of discretion contained in the Hippocratic
Oath, [] every patient has a right to rely upon this warranty of
silence.” Impairing the relationship between a physician and a
patient would therefore not only be unfair to patients that have
provided information to their physicians in confidence, but could
reduce the quality of medical care provided.106

While the opposition to informal discovery techniques involving
health care providers is supported by these considerations, neither
HIPAA’s text nor its legislative history contains a justification or
explanation of its intentions with regard to ex parte interviews,107 and

Physician, 13 CAMPBELL L. REV. 233, 236 (1991)).
103. Id. at 251.
104. See Mateo & Uitti, supra note 39, at 1.
105. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 230 F.R.D. 473, 476 (E.D. La. 2005) (quoting
LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND INTERPRETATION
(1943)).
106. Id. at 477 (internal citations omitted).
107. See Conning the IADC Newsletters, supra note 30, at 211.
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we are left only to assume that basic medical privacy concerns were at
the heart of the privacy rules promulgated by the DHHS. One
problem with relying on the physician-patient privilege to support
the prohibition of ex parte interviews is that in the context of
products liability or personal injury litigation, the concerns that
support the privilege are weakened or eliminated when a plaintiff files
a lawsuit,108 mainly because in so doing, a plaintiff has placed
previously protected health information at issue, thereby subjecting
the information to discovery. Nevertheless, the physician-patient
privilege has proven to be enough of a consideration to warrant
widespread restrictions on ex parte interviews with physicians.
2. Arguments that informal discovery can harm physicians
Another reason put forth for the elimination of informal
discovery is the burden it places on physicians.109 First, “[p]hysicians
are placed in unenviable positions when defense attorneys engage
them in ex parte [sic] communications, because they are confronted
with numerous competing ethical, legal, and professional pressures in
deciding whether and how to respond to such requests.”110
Essentially, when a physician engages in an ex parte interview, the
danger arises that the physician will reveal confidential information
unrelated to the subject of the litigation and become liable for the
disclosure.111 Physicians are usually untrained in the law, and
allowing a physician to shoulder the burden of possible wrongful
disclosure is a gamble and is unfair to the doctor.112 One author has
suggested that if physicians were aware of the possible criminal, civil,
and administrative penalties that could result from an improper
physician disclosure, physicians “might object just as loudly as their
patients to any attempts to engage them in ex parte [sic]
communications.”113

108. See Berens, supra note 36, at 1481.
109. See David G. Wirtes, Jr., R. Edwin Lamberth & Joanna Gomez, An Important
Consequence of HIPAA: No More Ex Parte Communications Between Defense Attorneys and
Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 1, 10 (2003).
110. Id.
111. Russ, supra note 2, at 29.
112. Id. at 29–30 (quoting Roosevelt Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353,
357 (Iowa 1986)).
113. Wirtes et al., supra note 109, at 14.
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Some counter that such arguments fail to take into consideration
that ex parte conversations with defense attorneys are not mandatory
for the physician, who always has the opportunity for his own
attorney to be present if he desires. “[A]llowing ex parte
communications does not mandate that physicians must talk to
defense counsel. The treating physician would still be able to decide
what he or she wants to discuss.”114 Educating doctors on the
possible legal ramifications of an ex parte interview, and then
allowing the doctor to decide whether or not to provide the
interview, would seem to serve the same purpose as prohibiting the
interview altogether. Having the doctor’s own attorney present
would also provide the physician with the necessary legal protection.
It seems that many legislatures, however, have found it easier to
simply prohibit or restrict ex parte interviews, rather than hope that
individual doctors know enough to protect themselves from liability
stemming from an inadvertent disclosure of a patient’s private health
information.
Concerns also arise over possible ethical misconduct when an
attorney representing a medical malpractice insurer is allowed to
conduct an interview of a plaintiff’s physician insured by that same
company.115 One state’s Board of Medical Examiners takes the
position that “it is unethical and unprofessional for a physician to
allow financial incentives or contractual ties of any kind to adversely
affect his or her medical judgment of practice care.”116 When
physicians are placed in these situations, ethical questions are almost
certain to arise.
3. The argument that informal discovery harms the civil justice system
In modern times the rules of discovery and civil procedure are
intended in large part to prevent “Perry Mason” moments of surprise
and “trial by ambush.”117 Formal discovery methods such as
depositions, interrogatories, and ex parte interviews conducted
114. Smith, supra note 35, at 252 (citing John Jennings, The Physician-Patient
Relationship: The Permissibility of Ex Parte Communications Between Plaintiff’s Treating
Physicians and Defense Counsel, 59 MO. L. REV. 441, 459 (1994)).
115. Russ, supra note 2, at 30–31 (citing Manion v. N.P.W. Med. Ctr., 676 F. Supp.
585, 594–95 (M.D. Pa. 1987)).
116. Wirtes et al., supra note 109, at 13 (quoting ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 540-X-9-.07
(2005)).
117. Id. at 14.
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pursuant to regulations allow all parties to an action to keep abreast
of the relevant issues.118 In addition, following formal discovery
channels allows the court to keep an eye on (and, when necessary,
assert control over) the discovery proceedings.119
Others counter that when a defense attorney meets privately with
a plaintiff’s physician, the interview is intended to provide the
defense with information to which the plaintiff’s attorney has already
had complete access.
Arguably, plaintiffs’ attorneys who have filed lawsuits placing
clients’ medical conditions in issue have greater access to medical
information than defense attorneys because plaintiffs’ counsel can
easily obtain medical authorizations from their clients. Further, a
plaintiff’s attorney may communicate freely with her client
regarding the plaintiff’s medical care and treatment and may even
contact the plaintiff’s treating physician to discuss care before filing
the lawsuit.120

Ex parte interviews would not revive “Perry Mason moments,” but
rather would place defense and plaintiff’s counsel on the same
footing. In essence,
a rule disallowing ex parte communications with a plaintiff’s
treating physicians attempts to ensure the confidentiality of the
physician-patient relationship at the expense of the defendant.
Allowing a plaintiff to have free access to potentially important facts
and/or expert witnesses while requiring the defendant to use more
expensive, inconvenient, and burdensome formal discovery
methods tilts the litigation playing field in favor of the plaintiff.121

The argument is that rather than creating any kind of disparity,
permitting ex parte interviews with a plaintiff’s treating physician
allows equal access to relevant medical information.
4. Claimed benefits of informal discovery
Still others assert that, in spite of these arguments, the value of
the ex parte interviews outweighs any concerns.122 Some defense
118. See id.
119. Id. at 15.
120. Melissa A. Couch, Litigating Medical Malpractice Cases in Oklahoma: The
Aftermath of HIPAA, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 827, 827–28 (2004).
121. Jennings, supra note 114, at 475.
122. Berens, supra note 36, at 1481.
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attorneys complain that the elimination of informal discovery
prevents them from “doing their jobs”123 and contend that informal
discovery methods are essential to their work.124 In support of this
claim they argue both (1) that informal discovery is more cost
effective, and (2) that there is no substitute for the information
obtained through an ex parte interview.125 One court echoed those
sentiments, stating that
there are entirely respectable reasons for conducting discovery by
interview vice deposition: it is less costly and less likely to entail
logistical or scheduling problems; it is conducive to spontaneity and
candor in a way depositions can never be; and it is a cost-efficient
means of eliminating non-essential witnesses.126

Other courts have been critical of these arguments. Regarding
cost effectiveness, the Supreme Court of Missouri stated,
It is not clear that ex parte [sic] discussion ultimately results in the
conservation of resources. The defendant must expend time and
effort to prepare the authorization and move for the court order
compelling execution. The defendant will spend further time and
effort to secure and review the plaintiff’s medical records so that
the defendant has an intelligent basis upon which to have an ex
parte [sic] discussion with the physician.127

In response to the informational argument, one Illinois court stated
simply that “it is undisputed that ex parte [sic] conferences yield no
greater evidence, nor do they provide any additional information,
than that which is already obtainable through the regular methods of
discovery.”128 The information available through informal means is
still available to the defense attorney; HIPAA just requires that
defense attorneys follow formal procedures in order to obtain it. But
even if the information available turns out to be the same, the
defense attorney would likely prefer informal discovery since the
information could be obtained earlier and more easily.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See Russ, supra note 2, at 29.
See id.
See id. at 31.
Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983).
State ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389, 394 (Mo. 1989).
Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
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The idea that the policy reasons for protecting the physicianpatient privilege outweigh any advantages that arise from the use of
informal discovery methods has not been conclusively accepted, but
the court decisions reviewed earlier all seem to support formal
restrictions or elimination of the ex parte interviews of health care
providers.129 As a result, any defense attorney desiring the
opportunity to conduct an ex parte interview with a plaintiff’s
physician must be prepared to satisfy the strict requirements of
HIPAA’s regulatory scheme, and should be prepared for a denial by
either the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s physician. “The breadth of
HIPAA and the substantial repercussions for HIPAA violations
undoubtedly will cause healthcare providers to think twice before
agreeing to ex parte interviews,” even if defense counsel has a strong
argument that HIPAA should not apply.130
IV. APPLYING HIPAA TO EMERGENCY RESPONDERS
Recent decisions have clarified the requirements for interviewing
a plaintiff’s treating physician, at least in a few jurisdictions. At the
very least, HIPAA’s requirements should be met prior to any ex
parte communication with the plaintiff’s treating physician. There are
questions regarding HIPAA’s application, however, which have yet
to be addressed in any degree by the courts. One of these questions
is whether the procedural requirements for conducting an ex parte
interview of a physician are applicable to emergency response
personnel such as firefighters, EMTs, and paramedics. Often, in
certain types of litigation such as personal injury or products liability
cases, there is an incident or accident that serves as the trigger and
basis for the plaintiff’s claim. In many such cases, a first responder is
called to the scene and gains personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the incident. Some firms specializing in
these areas of defense employ investigators to conduct informal
interviews with first responders in order to learn the facts at the early
stages of litigation. However, with HIPAA now in place, and with
the continued use of HIPAA as a bullying tool to chill contact
between defense attorneys and plaintiffs’ physicians,131 the question

129. See infra Part III.A.
130. Conning the IADC Newsletters, supra note 30, at 214.
131. Id. at 215.
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has arisen as to whether these informal interviews are also subject to
HIPAA’s restrictions.
A. Applying HIPAA to Emergency Response Personnel
While the courts have not yet had the opportunity to decide
whether to apply HIPAA’s restrictions to EMTs and paramedics, the
issue would likely turn in large part on the statutory definitions
found in HIPAA’s text. In examining HIPAA’s definitions of
“covered entities,” emergency response personnel are unlikely to be
considered “covered entities” in any context except that of a “health
care provider.”132 HIPAA defines a health care provider as a provider
of services under 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u), a provider of medical or
health services under 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(s), and any other person or
organization who furnishes, bills, or is paid for health care in the
normal course of business.133 Among the health services listed under
§ 1395x(s) are ambulance services, “where the use of other methods
of transportation is contraindicated by the individual’s condition.”134
This undoubtedly includes emergency situations in which paramedics
or EMTs accompany patients to the hospital in an ambulance.
In addition, 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 defines health care as “care,
services, or supplies related to the health of an individual.”135 The
statute continues: “Health care includes, but is not limited to, the
following: Preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, rehabilitative,
maintenance, or palliative care, and counseling, service, assessment,
or procedure with respect to the physical or mental condition, or
functional status, of an individual or that affects the structure or
function of the body . . . .”136 Since emergency response personnel
perform procedures with respect to the physical, mental, or
functional status of the body, along with diagnosis and assessment,
they could be technically termed “health care provider[s]” by the
terms of the statute. Were the issue to be brought before the courts,
a literal interpretation of HIPAA’s provisions would subject

132. Under HIPAA’s definitions, emergency response personnel are not a “health plan”
or a “health care clearinghouse.” 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(4) (2005).
134. Id. § 1395x(s)(7).
135. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
136. Id.
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emergency response personnel to the same discovery limitations that
apply to physicians.
Many states have considered whether emergency medical
personnel are health care providers for the purposes of various state
statutes. In almost all such cases, EMTs and paramedics have been
included as health care providers.137 At least one state, however,
excludes paramedics and EMTs from the category of “health care
practitioner.” In Watson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,138 the plaintiff
prevailed at trial, but after the verdict was entered, the parties
bickered over the amount of attorneys fees.139 One of the plaintiff’s
contentions was that the defense had violated a Florida statute
prohibiting the disclosure of information given by a patient to a
“health care practitioner” unless other requirements were previously
met, such as the issuance of a subpoena.140 The plaintiff contended
that defense counsel had violated Florida law by conferring ex parte
with the paramedic who had responded to the emergency call when
the plaintiff fell.141 Under section 456.001(6) of the Florida Statutes,
a “health care practitioner” is a person licensed under certain
chapters of the Florida Statutes.142 The chapter under which
paramedics were licensed was absent from the list. On this basis, the
Federal District Court for the Northern District of Florida noted in
an unpublished opinion that “[i]t thus was not unlawful, and it also
was not unreasonable, for defendant’s attorneys to interview the
paramedic, a witness to events at issue.”143

137. See, e.g., Bodelson v. City of Littleton, 36 P.3d 214, 215 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001)
(concluding that paramedics are “health care providers” under Colorado statutes); Mooney v.
Sneed, No. 02A01-9709-CV-00210, 1999 WL 174133, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31,
1999), aff’d, 30 S.W.3d 304 (Tenn. 2000) (holding that EMTs are “health care practitioners”
under Tennessee statute); Gross v. Innes, 930 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding
that paramedics are “medical personnel” for purposes of governmental immunity statute);
Carter v. Milford Valley Mem’l Hosp., 996 P.2d 1076, 1079 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (holding
that paramedics are “health care providers” under Utah’s Malpractice Act); Marthaller v. King
County Hosp., 973 P.2d 1098, 1102 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A] paramedic is a health care
practitioner . . . .”); Linville v. City of Janesville, 497 N.W.2d 465, 472 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993),
aff’d, 516 N.W.2d 427 (Wis. 1994) (holding that paramedics are medical personnel for
purposes of Wisconsin’s governmental immunity statute).
138. No. 4:03CV402RH/WCS, 2005 WL 1266686 (N.D. Fla. May 25, 2005).
139. Id. at *1.
140. Id. at *2; see FLA. STAT. § 456.057(6) (2005).
141. Watson, 2005 WL 1266686, at *2.
142. FLA. STAT. § 456.001(6).
143. Watson, 2005 WL 1266686, at *2.

1100

ROCHE.MRO.DOC

1075]

10/12/2006 1:12:45 PM

HIPAA’s Effect on Informal Discovery

It is important to note that this decision was made after HIPAA
came into full effect. It appears, then, that there are at least some
grounds for the ex parte interviewing of paramedics and EMTs.
However, the Watson opinion makes no mention of HIPAA.144 In
addition, while the Florida statute is similar to HIPAA, HIPAA’s
regulatory scheme does not rely on a list of licensing statutes for
inclusion as a “health care provider,” but rather on its own included
definitions. Therefore, while Watson provides a possible argument
that emergency response personnel are not “health care providers,”
especially under Florida law, the statutory text indicates that they will
be treated as such.145
B. Emergency Response Personnel Should Not Be Subject
to HIPAA’s Regulatory Scheme
Despite the fact that under HIPAA’s language paramedics and
EMTs are subject to the same discovery limitations as physicians,
emergency response personnel should be excluded from some of
HIPAA’s regulations, including the prohibition against ex parte
interviews.146 For instance, if the legislative history had no indication
of its applicability to ex parte interviews with physicians,147 a debated
practice among the various jurisdictions, it seems even less likely that
Congress intended to eliminate ex parte interviews in a context in
which they had been almost universally accepted. Another simple
reason for treating emergency response personnel differently is the
144. Id.
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(4) (2005).
146. While this Comment focuses on ex parte interviews, the application of HIPAA to
emergency responders has been shown to be problematic in other contexts, as shown by the
following anecdote:
On June 9, 2003, two months after the new Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) took effect, a Colorado man lay dying of a heart attack
in his rural backyard. Neighbors trying to aid the man watched helplessly as an
ambulance passed his house, according to a newspaper report. The ambulance
crisscrossed the area, with paramedics stopping to ask how to find the man’s address.
Following western Colorado custom, neighbors didn’t know how to give directions
based on an address. Give us a name, they said, and we’ll tell you where to go. But
under their interpretation of the new HIPAA privacy regulations, the paramedics
refused to release any information that would identify the man. The man died in his
yard, although officials do not know if paramedics could have saved him had they
found him earlier.
Morantz, supra note 11, at 479 (as reported in Parker, supra note 10, at A1).
147. Conning the IADC Newsletters, supra note 30, at 211.
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difference between the nature of an EMT’s or a paramedic’s
responsibilities and those of a personal physician. Despite the fact
that emergency responders can be lumped into a nebulous definition
of “health care providers”—most likely unintentionally—it seems
obvious that EMTs and paramedics do not fill the same role as a
physician. The policy reasons behind HIPAA’s restrictions on
informal discovery are weaker when applied to emergency response
personnel.
1. EMTs and paramedics generally do not maintain physician-patient
relationships
Perhaps the strongest argument made in support of HIPAA’s
prohibition of informal discovery is that such a rule protects the
physician-patient relationship; but in an emergency responder
context, there is no legally protected relationship.148 HIPAA protects
personally identifiable health information and strengthens the
physician-patient relationship by insulating doctors from situations in
which an improper disclosure may occur.149 But as previously pointed
out, there is no common law basis for the physician-patient
privilege,150 much less for an EMT-patient privilege. And until a
legislature determines to create a firefighter-patient or paramedicpatient privilege, it does not exist. For that reason, policies created to
protect the physician-patient privilege are wrongly applied in the
emergency responder context.
And there are other reasons for limiting restrictions on ex parte
interviews to a person’s physicians. For instance, patients are much
less likely to have the opportunity to choose their emergency
response personnel as they are to pick a physician. Contact with an
EMT or paramedic is more likely to be the result of a random
assignment or of the proximity or availability of the responder
relative to other responders. And even if a patient was given a choice
in an emergency, the very fact that it is an emergency makes it highly
unlikely that the patient would have or express a preference.
In addition, patients do not seek out paramedics in order to
disclose an ailment or seek consultation. Emergency medical
personnel are sent out based on availability in order to deal with
148. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 230 F.R.D. 473, 476–77 (E.D. La. 2005).
149. See Wirtes et al., supra note 109, at 10–14.
150. Smith, supra note 35, at 247.

1102

ROCHE.MRO.DOC

1075]

10/12/2006 1:12:45 PM

HIPAA’s Effect on Informal Discovery

injuries or emergency situations that have just arisen. Therefore,
there is virtually no need for a patient to develop a confidential
relationship with an emergency responder. By nature, a paramedicpatient relationship is less confidential than a physician-patient
relationship. Of course, an emergency responder might ask about
allergies, illnesses, current medication, or consumption of alcohol or
drugs. The answers to such questions might be information the
patient would like to keep secret. Yet negative answers to those
questions would likely not be embarrassing, and in most instances,
positive answers would be made at issue the moment the patient
decided to file a lawsuit based on that incident. Therefore, the
chilling effect on patient disclosure that would occur if physicians did
not maintain confidentiality is not as great of a concern in an
emergency context.
2. EMTs and paramedics are less likely to be harmed by informal
discovery
While physicians suffer from liability and confidentiality concerns
in the context of ex parte interviews,151 emergency response
personnel are less likely to face these concerns. Currently, an EMT or
paramedic has neither the pressures of a confidential relationship nor
the potential for improper disclosure that a physician faces. Of
course, applying HIPAA regulations to them would change that fact,
but even so, HIPAA’s application would not be enough to create a
statutory privilege. And while a physician in an ex parte interview
runs the risk of inadvertently disclosing information that is unrelated
to the lawsuit, an EMT or paramedic in the same interview is less
likely to reveal unrelated information for the simple reason that they
possess little of such information. There could be instances in which
the paramedic has repeatedly responded to emergencies involving the
same individual, in which case they might possess information
irrelevant to the present lawsuit, but those cases would be rare.
Because emergency responders have less information to keep private
in an interview, it is likely that they would have an easier time
keeping it private. And most importantly, even if a paramedic did
share private information, he or she would not be subject to liability
on the basis of the violation of a statutory privilege, because there is
no privilege in place.
151. See Wirtes et al., supra note 109, at 10.
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3. Arguments about information loss have a real basis in an emergency
context
In addition, some arguments that have proven ineffective with
respect to allowing ex parte interviews of physicians make more sense
when applied to the question of interviews with paramedics and
EMTs. Defense attorneys have argued that there is more information
available through an ex parte interview than through formal
discovery procedures.152 Some courts have rejected these arguments
in the context of physician interviews,153 but there are some key
considerations that make the argument more reasonable in the case
of emergency medical personnel.
For example, a physician typically keeps detailed medical records
for each of his or her patients, and when litigation arises this is often
the information a defense attorney is seeking. The information an
emergency responder possesses is usually the result of responding to
an accident scene or other event, and thus will almost always include
more than health information. In fact, a paramedic or EMT will
commonly be sought out by defense counsel less for the plaintiff’s
health information, and more for their observations of an accident
scene or the chronology of events. Firefighters and paramedics tend
to be among the first to arrive at an accident scene, and thus can
become essential fact witnesses. The very nature of the job places an
emergency response person in a position to testify about more than
just the medical condition of an individual.
Because an emergency responder does not usually have a
recurring relationship with a patient, the paramedic’s or EMT’s
recollection of a particular person is almost sure to fade quickly. In
addition, while there may be some record kept of any health-related
procedures, an EMT or paramedic may only record the bare
minimum, while other observations regarding the accident scene or
the patient’s condition will be lost through the normal fading of
memory.154 When a defense attorney’s main purpose is to discover
any material facts that a paramedic may have observed, HIPAA’s
application would foil this purpose by delaying discovery until after
relevant details may have faded from memory. And while there is no
direct indication of HIPAA’s purpose to this end, HIPAA bases the
152. Russ, supra note 2, at 29–31.
153. Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 956 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
154. See supra note 4.
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delay solely on the concern that the paramedic may possess healthrelated information (or even more unfortunately, because the
emergency responder’s job description falls within HIPAA’s
statutory definition).
Were HIPAA applied as strictly to EMTs or paramedics as it is to
plaintiffs’ physicians, defense attorneys would find that useful
information would be lost to them in almost every instance. Despite
one court’s statement that “ex parte conferences yield no greater
evidence” than formal discovery,155 there is an obvious difference
between the amount of information that can be retrieved from an
EMT or paramedic shortly after an incident and the amount
retrievable in a deposition that takes place two or three years later.
Yet under HIPAA’s definitions, there is no distinction made between
one type of “health care provider” and another,156 leaving EMTs and
paramedics subject to the same discovery restrictions as a personal
physician. The slight possibility that some health information
(information most likely related to the litigation) may be released, or
the fact that emergency response personnel are technically “health
care providers” under HIPAA’s definitions,157 are not compelling
reasons for denying a defense attorney the opportunity to retrieve
this essential information.
V. CONCLUSION
HIPAA’s privacy regulations were created in order to allow
patients to exert greater control over their private health
information. The majority of the courts have interpreted these
provisions, however, as also removing informal discovery procedures
from the arsenal of the litigator. A defense attorney may no longer
conduct an ex parte interview of a plaintiff’s physician unless, at the
minimum, HIPAA’s strict procedures for formal discovery are
adhered to. While some attorneys have complained that HIPAA has
thus handicapped their ability to perform defense work, there are
some compelling reasons for HIPAA’s statutory scheme, and in all
likelihood it will continue. Protection of the physician-patient
relationship and the integrity of the civil justice system are concerns
155. Russ, supra note 2, at 31 (citing Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 952, 956
(Ill. App. Ct. 1986)).
156. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005).
157. Id.
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that lie at the heart of HIPAA’s apparent aversion to informal
discovery.
On the other hand, the role of emergency response personnel
such as EMTs and paramedics differs in many ways from that of
physicians, and although emergency responders are included in
HIPAA’s definition of a “health care provider,” such personnel
should be permitted greater freedom than that allowed by HIPAA’s
current regulatory scheme. Some of the interests that support
restricting the ability to conduct ex parte interviews with a plaintiff’s
physician may still exist in the context of emergency response
personnel, but those that remain are significantly weaker. At the
same time, the arguments offered in support of ex parte interviews—
largely ineffectual when applied in the physician context—are
stronger when made in the emergency responder context. Allowing
defense attorneys the opportunity to conduct ex parte interviews
with EMTs and paramedics would be of great benefit to a defendant
without damaging the relationships and privileges that HIPAA is
designed to protect.
In order to prevent or mitigate HIPAA’s chilling effect on ex
parte interviews of emergency response personnel, in order to
provide defense counsel with the tools and information necessary to
best serve their clients, and in light of the complete lack of indicia in
the legislative history of any intent to limit contact with EMTs and
paramedics, HIPAA’s restrictions on informal discovery should not
be applied to emergency responders.
Daniel M. Roche
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